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April 23, 1972, Page 4The New York Times Archives

DETROIT — On April 8, George Krumbhaar Jr., a Washington attorney, was doing 70 on Interstate 708 near Hancock, Md., when, suddenly, the engine of his 1972 Ford Torino station wagon began racing wildly. Then—barn—the rear end of the automobile slammed to the highway. The car skidded along the highway for about 200 yards and as it came to a stop, flames shot out under the rear near the gas tank. The shaken Mr. Krumbhaar left his wife and two children on the side of the expressway and hiked a mile to house, where he called the Hancock Ford dealer. The car was towed to the garage, where it was kept for about two weeks before it was repaired.

The Krumbhaar family outing was brought to an end by faulty bearings. The bearings failed and the rear axle and rear wheels pulled away from the car. And last week, it was revealed that Mr. Krumbhaar was not the only man in the country with Ford problems. The Ford Motor Company announced in Detroit that it had had 16 reports of such trouble and was recalling 423,000 1972 Torinos and Mercury Montegos to guard against bearing failures. The cost to Ford: $5‐million to $10‐million.

Ford intends to install an extra set of retainer plates in the rear axles of the automobiles to “insure audible warning in the event of bearing failure.” Thus, the failures still can occur, but before they do, a screeching noise, caused by the extra plates, will serve notice that the bearings are about to go. Then, under Ford's plan, the driver will take his car to his local Ford agency, where the bearings will be replaced without charge.

This hardlypatisfied the critics. Dr. Carl Nash, a physicist with the Public Interest Research Group, a Ralph Nader organization in Washington, described the Ford plan as the “balingwire” approach to guarding against safety defects. Indeed, at week's end, Ford was reported to be examining its production schedules with an eye to producing enough additional axle shafts to replace the entire axle unit.

Dr. Nash said the recall placed Ford in the class with General Motors Corporation in dealing with auto safety, an unkind reference to the G.M. recall of 6.7‐million Chevrolet cars and trucks last December, the largest recall in history. In that recall, G.M. said it would install straps to hold possibly faulty engine mounts in position, and G.M. president Edward N. Cole said that the failure of the engine mounts—which motorists described as a terrifying experience—“was no more serious than a flat tire.”

Recalls in recent years have become a regular part of American life, as assured it seems, as automobile production itself. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in Washington, about 25 million American and foreign‐made vehicles have been recalled in this country since 1966, when the Highway Safety Act was passed. This means that four of every 10 autos or trucks, American or foreign, sold in this country since 1966 have been recalled.

Recalls come about when the N.H.T.S.A. or an auto company suspects that autos or trucks may have safety defects. The N.H.T.S.A. has no power to order recalls. It recommends that the companies institute a recall, or the companies do this on their own. When recalls are instituted, the auto companies estimate that only between 50 and 85 per cent of recalled vehicles are actually brought in for safety checks.

The auto manufacturers insist that their cars have never been safer, more durable, or more trouble‐free. They have been recalling automobiles for decades, they say, beginning in 1916 when Buick discovered that its gas tanks were falling off. Buick solved the problem—somewhat as G.M. solved the engine‐mount problem—by putting an extra support on the gas tanks.

Before the rise of consumerism, recalls, however many and for what reasons, were done privately. Figures comparing that era to this have never been revealed.

What has happened in recent years, the companies say, is that with the rise of the consumer movement there is more publicity about recalls. A Ford official says that the nation is fortunate to “have the luxury” to be focusing on problems like the Torino and Montego bearings instead “of where am I going to get my next job —the things my father went through.”

A Chrysler official says that less than 2 per cent of the firm's output is involved in recalls. However, auto critic Nash says that the fact that 25 million vehicles have been involved in recall campaigns in seven years tells him that “auto companies are trying to cut their costs to the bone.”

The industry laments that stories about recalls—which the companies say are done in the best interest of customer safety—usually end up on front pages and bring only unfavorable publicity. “We try to be the good guys,” says one industry man, “and we get it in the teeth.”

Ralph Nader, the auto critic, remains adamant, of course. He contends that methods of guarding against safety defects, like straps for engine mounts and warning devices for Ford bearings, “are becoming increasingly shoddy.” He says there must be new legislation to give the Government authority to order recalls and the companies should be made to explain publicly to the Government how defects come about, what executives were responsible and what reforms have been instituted to guard against future defects.

The cost of anticipated recalls, he contends, has now been figured into the price of buying a car And the firms he says, also profit by selling parts unrelated to the recall to customers who bring their cars in for safety checks and by giving them service. “Recalls,” Mr. Nader contends, “are good business.”

Yet the best of auto testing may not reveal problems. The major target of Detroit's Critics, for example, was always G.M.'s Corvair car. But the magazine Consumer Reports, no ally of Detroit, tested the Corvair when it came out in 1960 and said of its inclination to over‐respond under slippery road conditions: “No problem arises from this tendency in normal driving.” And, in any case, the magazine said, this “single undesirable feature” had made possible “some important handling gains.”

The Corvair, of course, was the automobile that Mr. Nader attacked in his famous book, “Unsafe at Any Speed,” and which G.M. later killed, largely as a result of Mr. Nader's disastrous attack.

Mr. Serrin is a Detroit reporter and the author of a forthcoming study of General Motors and the United. Auto Workers.

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